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ABSTRACT 
Post-War conceptions of human rights have evolved independently of long-established theory and 
practice of property and creditor rights, to the detriment of the development and implementation 
of human rights law. This chapter attempts to build a first bridge between these two fields of law. 
It begins by recalling the strikingly different origin and implementation of ‘human’ versus property 
and creditor rights, because the differences have significant implications. Human rights laws are 
more honoured in the breach than in the observance in most parts of the world, principally 
because states accepted international standards governing the treatment of their own nationals in 
their own territory while reserving to themselves the sovereign right to enforce those rights as they 
saw fit. In sharp contrast, when it comes to property and creditor rights, there are few gaps 
between principled intentions, legal mandates, and actual enforcement. Property and creditor 
rights are important for the attainment of other human rights, especially those of an economic 
nature, and many human rights are connected to, and are rather inseparable from, broadly 
conceived property rights. There follows a discussion of the still wide gap between aspirational 
human rights and economic reality. The time has come for human rights scholars to ratchet down 
their expectations to match the very limited capacity of low-income and formerly communist 
countries most prone to human rights deficiencies to import the Western European welfare state 
model. The final section focuses on the poorly understood interconnections between sovereign 
debts and human rights. Neglect of property and creditor-rights considerations has led many 
contemporary human rights advocates down an infertile, if not inappropriate, intellectual and 
policy path. Speculation that contracts governing cross-border debts and investments may not be 
sufficiently compelling, at least relative to human rights commitments, is unwarranted and 
counterproductive. 
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Introduction* 
The ample literature on human rights, including that focusing on economic rights, makes only 
occasional mention of long-established property and creditor rights. The omission may be 
rooted in the fact that most of the declarations and conventions on human rights issued in the 
last five decades gave unduly short shrift to private-property and creditor rights. Here, I begin by 
reflecting on the strikingly different origins of ‘human’ versus property and creditor rights, 
because the differences have implications. I subsequently highlight the importance of the 
enforcement of property and creditor rights for the attainment of other human rights, especially 
those of an economic nature. There follows a discussion of the wide gap between aspirational 
human rights and economic reality. Then, I shed light on the poorly understood 
interconnections between sovereign debt and human rights, because most writings on the topic 
fail to recognize the trade-offs and incompatibilities that arise because of existing property and 
creditor rights. Neglect of property and creditor-rights considerations has led many 
contemporary human rights advocates down an infertile intellectual and practical path. 
 
Origins of human, property and creditor rights 
The foremost human rights documents are the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR) 
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in December 1948, plus two associated 
treaties, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), both approved in December 1966 
and effective as of March 1976. Combined, the three documents are commonly known as the 
International Bill of Human Rights. 
The UDHR contains thirty articles that refer largely to civil and political human rights, with 
articles 17, 23, 25, and arguably 26, enumerating fundamental rights of an economic nature, 
though they are often referred to as social rights.1 Listed first is article 17, the right to own 
property, from which no one is to be arbitrarily deprived. In second place (article 23) are the 
                                                          
* Draft of a chapter to be published in Sovereign Debt and Human Rights, edited by Ilias Bantekas and 
Cephas Lumina (Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press, forthcoming in 2018). 
 
1 See http://www.un.org/en/universal-declaration-human-rights/ 
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rights to free choice of employment; just and favourable work conditions; protection against 
unemployment; equal pay for equal work; just and favourable remuneration (‘ensuring for 
himself and his family an existence worthy of human dignity’); and freedom to form and join 
trade unions. 
Then comes (article 25) the right to an adequate standard of living, which includes ‘food, 
clothing, housing, and medical care and necessary social services, and the right to security in the 
event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood, old age or other lack of livelihood,’ 
with ‘special care and assistance’ provided for motherhood and childhood. Finally, and since a 
basic education is integral to an adequate standard of living, article 26 recognizes the right to 
education, which encompasses free and compulsory elementary education, ‘generally available’ 
technical and professional education, and higher education ‘equally accessible to all on the basis 
of merit’. 
With the notable exception of property rights, which disappear from view, and the lack of any 
mention of creditor rights, these basic economic rights are also included and expanded upon in 
the ICESCR, which follows the structure of the UDHR and the ICCPR and features thirty-one 
ambitious articles.2 Articles 6, 7 and 8 focus on specific elements of employment rights. Articles 
6 and 7 detail the right to work, benefit from vocational training, and enjoyment of fair wages 
and equal remuneration for equal work; a decent living; safe and healthy working conditions; 
promotion opportunities; and vacations. Article 8 dwells on protections of trade union rights, 
and article 9 spells out the right to social security, including to social insurance. 
Articles 10 through 14 of the ICESCR cover the rights of mothers and children, including to 
childbirth-related benefits; rights to an adequate standard of living, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing; the right ‘to the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of physical 
and mental health’; and the right to education. These entitlements are specified in considerable 
detail. Governments are to improve food production, conservation and distribution methods, 
and to ensure an equitable distribution of food supplies relative to needs. They are to reduce 
infant mortality and to prevent, treat and control epidemic, endemic, occupational and other 
diseases. Beyond providing compulsory and free elementary education, secondary and university 
                                                          
2 See http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CESCR.aspx 
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schooling is to be made ‘generally available and accessible to all’ – and to become progressively 
free of charge. 
These United Nations instruments spawned similar treaties at the world’s regional levels: the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), an international treaty that entered into force 
in 1953; the American Convention on Human Rights (ACHR, 1978); the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights (ACHPR, 1981); and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) Human Rights Declaration (HRD, 2012). All of these treaties feature lists of similar 
civil, political, social and economic rights – and all of them recognize some rights to property, 
with the European and Inter-American system having developed the relatively broadest concept 
of property under human rights jurisprudence.3 However, as in the case with the UN treaties, 
these regional undertakings include neither a free-standing right to private property – the right to 
acquire property is not specified – nor do they make any mention of creditor rights. Their 
protections against expropriation and regulatory takings are weak.4 
Property rights, to a greater or lesser extent, are also recognised in several other multilateral 
treaties born out of the United Nations. These are the International Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (1969); the Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Discrimination against Women (1981); the Convention relating to the Status of 
Refugees (1954); and the Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers 
and Members of Their Families (2003). 
The origin of the human rights movement that gave rise to these treaties, and to the greater 
public awareness – including within the legal profession – of the need to expand recognition and 
observance of civil, political, social and economic rights, has been the subject of debate. By far 
the most common starting point for modern histories of human rights is the post-World War II 
period. This is illustrated by the recollections of the late Louis Henkin, widely considered one of 
the most influential scholars of international law: 
International human rights law… began with the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights [and …] did not draw on old international sources, or on ancient notions of 
natural law, or on Roman law, or on modern sources of international politics, not 
                                                          
3 Chrystin Ondersma, ‘A Human Rights Framework for Debt Relief’ (2014) 36 U Pa J Int’l L 269, 325-26. 
4 Jacob Mchangama, ‘The Right to Property in Global Human Rights Law’ (2011) 33 Cato Policy Report 1. 
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even on the 18th-19th century ‘international standard of justice’ for foreign 
nationals. Rather, it derives wholly from contemporary national sources.5 
Some have argued that the history of international human rights can plausibly be pushed back by 
at least 100 years, because the Anglo-American campaign to end slavery (1833-65) and the 
international suffrage movement to secure the vote for women (1888-1928), foresaw the 
twentieth century approaches to civil and political rights.6 The widespread adoption of treaties 
against the slave trade introduced the idea that violations of human rights were offenses of 
concern to humankind generally, and particularly in the United States, it was campaigners for 
abolition, who had mastered grassroots organizing, that became the chief promoters of women’s 
legal rights. 
Others have made the case that, on the contrary, it was not until the 1970s that a utopianism 
coalesced in the international human rights movement, such that had never existed before.7 The 
year 1977, in particular, is believed to have marked a watershed in the international human rights 
movement, because that was when Amnesty International won the Nobel Peace Prize, and also 
when U.S. President Jimmy Carter invoked human rights as the guiding principle for his foreign 
policy. As has been pointed out, the words ‘human rights’ almost never were used in English 
prior to the 1940s, but in 1977 they appeared in the New York Times nearly five times as often as 
in any prior year in that newspaper’s history.8 
The short record of aspirational human rights jurisprudence and practice contrasts sharply with 
the rich history of organically developed property and creditor rights. Reliable generalizations 
about the earliest concept of property rights among hunter-gatherers are that it emerged as the 
unintended consequence of food collecting, ancient tool- and weapon-making, and the erection 
of temporary shelter.9 The development of farming, in the millennia since 10,000 BC, expanded 
the concept of private ownership by encouraging individual families and tribes to claim control 
                                                          
5 Louis Henkin, ‘Human Rights and State “Sovereignty”’ (1996) 25 Georgia J Int’L & Comp Law 31, 39-40. 
6 Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, ‘Historical Precursors to Modern Transnational Social Movements and 
Networks’ in John A Guidry, Michael D Kennedy and Mayer N Zald (eds) Globalizations and Social Movements 
(Michigan UP 2000) 35; Jenny S Martinez, ‘Human Rights and History’ (2013) 126 Harvard Law Review Forum 221. 
7 Samuel Moyn, ‘The Last Utopia: Human Rights in History’ (Belknap 2010) 1; Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann, 
‘Introduction: Genealogies of Human Rights’ in Stefan-Ludwig Hoffmann (ed) Human Rights in the Twentieth Century 
(CUP 2011) 4. 
8 Ibid, Hoffmann, 4. 
9 James E Krier, ‘Evolutionary Theory and the Origin of Property Rights’ (2009) 95 Cornell LR 139, 158. 
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of the land committed to cultivation.10 As populations concentrated around agricultural areas, 
control over prime land became more valuable, claims on property began to be documented, 
and deference gave way to new enforcement customs and mechanisms. ‘Possession, as any 
property lawyer knows, remains the cornerstone of most contemporary property systems – nine 
points of the law, the root of title, and the origin of property’.11 
In the Mediterranean, private ownership rose to visible prominence in the ancient Greek states 
and later in the Roman Empire, and for its citizens it extended to land, slaves and goods. Rome 
facilitated trading activity by defending private ownership and by legitimizing contractual 
agreements.12 During the Dark Ages in Europe, however, private ownership gave way to 
collective proprietorship, and thus land became the property of local abbeys, feudal villages, and 
peasant farms.13 It was mainly in the large cities, beginning with the important city-states in 
northern Italy and the lowlands, where new forms of mercantilist activities that emerged during 
the Renaissance rekindled efforts to improve upon an individual’s right to private property.14 
The rule of law reasserted itself, especially in England with King John’s signing of the Magna 
Carta in 1215. Gradually, the monopolistic feudal economy gave way to mercantilism, and later 
to increasingly free markets that functioned on the back of effective rights to private property.15 
The recognition of private property rights advanced in the late 1700s, in the wake of the 
American and French Revolutions. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen, 
adopted by France’s National Constituent Assembly in 1789, is a fundamental document in the 
history of civil rights whose content reflected many of the ideals of the American Revolution. Its 
article 17, in particular, states the following: ‘The right to property being inviolable and sacred, 
no one ought to be deprived of it, except in cases of evident public necessity, legally ascertained, 
and on condition of a previous just indemnity’.16 
During the early 1800s, property rights were codified throughout Europe and beyond and the 
French Civil Code of 1804 was particularly influential. It was promulgated throughout the 
                                                          
10 Harold Demsetz, ‘Toward a Theory of Property Rights II: The Competition between Private and Collective 
Ownership’ (2002) 31 J of Legal Studies 653, 667. 
11 Krier (n 9) 159. 
12 Demsetz (n 10) 667. 
13 Demsetz (n 10) 668. 
14 Micheline Ishay, The History of Human Rights: From Ancient Times to the Globalization Era (Univ of California Press 
2008) 91. 
15 Ibid 64. 
16 See http://www.constitutionnet.org/files/declaration_of_the_rights_of_man_1789.pdf 
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Napoleonic Empire and served as a model for the legal codes of more than twenty nations 
throughout the world.17 The Code’s article 544 established private, absolute and exclusive 
property as the main form of property legally attainable, at the expense of the other two major 
regimes that had prevailed since medieval times, namely: collective property (the Commons) and 
dissociated property (the Dominia). It defined property as the ‘right of enjoying and disposing of 
things in the most absolute manner, provided they are not used in a way prohibited by the laws 
or statutes’.18 
Creditor rights, namely, the procedural provisions that enable persons to collect money or goods 
or services that they are owed, have a long history likewise measured in millennia. In very 
primitive societies, the figures of debtors and creditors were generally unknown, and thus there 
were no written rules addressing what we now recognize as fraud, or regulating the distribution 
of a debtor’s estate among his creditors.19 Given the circumstances, payments were uniformly 
contemporaneous with the delivery of goods, and thus cash was king. 
Sales on credit were a feature of less primitive societies, and thus there arose the possibility that 
one of the contracting parties would be late in performing. Public opinion provided two 
powerful sanctions in cases of late payment: one had religious roots; the other was a brutal form 
of the procedure of execution. Typical of the former was the practice of the creditor sitting 
himself at the debtor’s entrance, there to remain until the obligation was fulfilled. ‘The expected 
payment was seldom delayed, for public opinion would have punished instantly and severely the 
debtor who allowed his creditor to become exhausted or to die of starvation before his door’.20 
The other means of compelling payment was seizing the debtor by force and coercing him to 
work until the obligation was settled – or seizing the debtor’s relatives and selling them into 
bondage for the same purpose. The Law of the Twelve Tables, the legislation dating to 451 BC 
that stood at the foundation of Roman law, illustrates this latter sanction because it codified it. 
According to Table III, if a debtor failed to fulfil his obligation, the creditor could arrest him. 
And after having thrice publicly invited anyone, without success, to come forward and pay the 
                                                          
17 Michela Barbot, ‘When the History of Property Rights Encounters the Economics of Convention: Some Open 
Questions Starting from European History’ (2015) 40 Historical Social Research 78, 80. 
18 See http://www.napoleon-series.org/research/government/code/c_code2.html 
19 Louis E Levinthal, ‘The Early History of Bankruptcy Law’ (1918) 66 U Pa LR 223, 228. 
20 Ibid 229. 
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debt at issue during a sixty-day period, the debtor ‘shall suffer capital punishment or shall be 
delivered for sale abroad across the Tiber River’.21 
In the course of time, execution for debt came to be directed against the property of the debtor 
rather than his person, probably because debtors often were delinquent to more than one 
creditor, and yet only the one who moved first could seize the debtor. Rutilius Rufus, a Roman 
Consul around 105 BC, is credited with having introduced a process of general execution against 
a debtor’s property known as bonorum emptio, an innovation that established the foundations of a 
bankruptcy regime.22 Whether the debtor was solvent or insolvent, whether there were many 
creditors or one, the proceeding was the same, leading to a sale of the entire estate of the debtor 
for the benefit of his creditors. It was also in ancient Rome that elaborate provisions for vitiating 
fraudulent transfers of property belonging to insolvent debtors were framed. Any act or 
forbearance by which a debtor diminished the amount of his property divisible among his 
creditors was held to be a fraud against creditors.23 
As was the case with property rights, creditor rights also eroded during the Dark Ages in 
Western Europe, but by the twelfth century the region was experiencing a restoration in 
commercial and intellectual life. A substantial merchant class developed trade networks ranging 
from England in the north to the Crusader States in the east, and with them came a revival of 
credit extension – as well as the application of the Roman system of private liquidation of the 
estates of insolvents. Elaborate regulations concerning bankruptcy are traced as far back as 1313, 
and over time the doctrine that a suspension of payment by a debtor renders him subject to a 
bankruptcy process spread throughout Europe, principally from the Italian cities to the German 
and French territories and beyond.24 
In thirteenth century England, during the reign of King Edward I, change came in the form of 
parliamentary statutes that dealt harshly with defaulting debtors. Interestingly, Parliament 
excused this severity in the preamble to the first of these statutes – the Statute of Acton Burnett 
of 1283 – on the ground that foreign merchants would not do business in England unless 
                                                          
21 See http://avalon.law.yale.edu/ancient/twelve_tables.asp 
22 William Smith, William Wayte and George E Marindin (eds), A Dictionary of Greek and Roman Antiquities Vol 1 
(John Murray 1901) 306; Levinthal (n 19) 231. 
23 Levinthal (n 19) 239. 
24 Ibid 242-44; Edward A Tomlinson, ‘Security for a Commercial Loan: Historical and International Perspectives’ 
(1999) 23 Md J Intl L & Trade, 77, 77-81. 
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provided with a ready means for securing payment of their debts.25 Even so, debtors devised 
various means of evading coercive imprisonment and/or liquidation of their estates, a fact that 
prompted the earliest forms of bankruptcy legislation in England: the Bankruptcy Act of 1542, 
as amended in 1570 and 1603 through successive acts of Parliament. The Elizabethan statute 
specified the process whereby, on petition of the creditor, the Chancellor and other bankruptcy 
commissioners would summon the bankrupt before them, examine him under oath, and if 
necessary imprison him until he forfeited his possessions, at which point his estate was 
distributed to his creditors.26 
Bankruptcy entered French law by the Ordinance of 1673, that country’s initial commercial 
codification. In the United States, the first federal law on the subject was the Bankruptcy Act of 
1800, which was limited to traders and provided only for involuntary proceedings, but was 
followed by several reforms culminating in the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, which 
established the modern concepts of debtor-creditor relations. Fast forward to today, and all 
things considered, property rights have been recognized as ‘the most frequently asserted and 
doggedly fortified right in world history’.27 
There is thus a striking difference between how international human rights principles have 
developed post-World War II, on the one hand, and how private-property and creditor-rights 
principles have developed during the past two millennia, on the other. Human rights initiatives 
have followed mainly a top-down model: drafted and codified during a period of years at the 
supranational level reflecting universal aspirations, governments have accepted them via 
subscriptions to international treaties. Property and creditor-rights laws, in contrast, have 
evolved in an organic, bottom-up manner: drafted, codified, implemented and then reformed 
throughout the centuries, they reflect practical societal needs and market realities. 
As a corollary, there is also a major difference in how these two sets of jurisprudence have been 
implemented. Human rights laws, whether addressing political, economic or other rights, remain 
far from honoured in most parts of the world. Empirical studies suggest that states that ratify 
human rights treaties do not improve their human rights performance, or else that the treaties 
                                                          
25 Tomlinson (n 24) 77. 
26 Jay Cohen, ‘The History of Imprisonment for Debt and its Relation to the Development of Discharge in 
Bankruptcy’ (1982) 3 J Legal Hist 153, 155-56. 
27 Moyn (n 7) 17. 
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have been associated with worse human rights practices.28 Even in the wealthy United States, for 
instance, the wish list of economic entitlements in the UDHR – in particular, articles 23, 25, and 
26 – is yet to become reality despite the passage of nearly seventy years. Moreover, any casual 
reading of daily news headlines, especially out of Africa and the Middle East, offers a painful 
reminder of the abject implementation failures, in even the most basic of civil and political 
rights, in dozens of signatory countries around the globe where atrocities are still commonplace. 
A plausible explanation for the yawning gap between theory and practice is that the normatively 
strong human rights system has been largely ineffectual because of a major procedural defect. 
States have accepted authoritative international standards governing the treatment of their own 
nationals in their own territory – but only because they reserved to themselves the exclusive, 
sovereign right to enforce those rights as they saw fit.29 Despite the passage of time, it is evident 
that most states are very reluctant to tolerate national legislation or institutions that will restrict 
their freedom of manoeuver in relation to human rights-related policies – especially in countries 
most in need of respect for basic human rights.30 Indeed, there is such aversion among states to 
countenance still more rights obligations that when an issue like human trafficking, say, is 
framed as a transnational crime, it receives much more state support than when put forth as a 
human rights issue.31 
In sharp contrast, there are few gaps between principled intentions, legal mandates, and nuts-
and-bolts reality when it comes to property and creditor rights. These rights have been grafted 
through the ages into constitutions, laws, regulations and everyday procedures because, for the 
most part, they are homegrown, perceived as necessary, and widely accepted. The 
implementation of property rights, in particular, does not pose a challenge to sovereign 
authority, because states can always exercise their rights to eminent domain, especially for public 
use, appropriating for themselves personal and even intangible property – as long as they pay 
just compensation. While it is often hard to demonstrate the justiciability of violations in human 
                                                          
28 Adam S Chilton and Eric A Posner, ‘The Influence of History on States’ Compliance with Human Rights 
Obligations’ (2017) 56 Va J Int’l L (forthcoming). 
29 Only the gravest of crimes, such as genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes, are subject to international 
enforcement. ‘All other human rights violations--that is, nearly all human rights violations--remain covered by the 
principle of national implementation of internationally recognized human rights’. See Jack Donnelly, ‘State 
Sovereignty and International Human Rights’ (2014) 28 Ethics & International Affairs 225, 231-32 
30 Ibid 229; Philip Alston, ‘Against a World Court for Human Rights’ (2014) 28 Ethics & International Affairs 197, 
201. 
31 Volha Charnysh, Paulette Lloyd and Beth A Simmons ‘Frames and Consensus Formation in International 
Relations: The Case of Trafficking in Persons’ (2015) 21 European J of International Relations, 323. 
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rights before national courts, it is easy to do so when it comes to breaches of property or 
creditor rights since they are governed almost exclusively by domestic law, except when covered 
by international investment agreements. 
 
Relationship between human, property and creditor rights 
Most of the academic literature on human rights makes little mention of the importance of 
strong property and creditor rights. This may be because of the perception that the latter are 
associated with business interests rather than the needs of ‘ordinary people,’ but as will be made 
clear below, nothing could be further from the truth. It may also reflect the purist view that 
property and creditor rights are to be considered separately, if at all, because they govern the 
relationship between humans and objects, whereas human rights govern how humans treat 
fellow humans.32 This is a narrow and unhelpful interpretation. 
The result of these approaches is that by now these rights lack shared jurisprudential concerns, 
substantive connections, or even a common language.33 In countries where the rule of law is well 
developed and reliably enforced, such separation between property and human rights need not 
be a major concern. In transition, post-conflict, and most other developing nations, however, 
where state power has been misused and the rule of law has been applied inadequately and 
unevenly, the disconnect is singularly unhelpful.  
Billions of people around the world still lack secure property rights, hampering the attainment of 
their economic, political and social rights because land and housing are the most important 
assets of the poor.34 Absence or insecurity of property rights is a central and ubiquitous cause of 
poverty, not only in the very poorest nations, but also in the largest middle-income countries 
such as Brazil, China, India and Russia. When property rights are not secure, economic 
transactions are hindered; efficient and sustainable resource use is unlikely; the evolution of 
effective credit markets is delayed; investment and entrepreneurial activities are discouraged; and 
thus the process of economic development has a hard time gaining traction. 
                                                          
32 Tim Hayward, ‘Human Rights vs Property Rights’ (2013) JWI Working Paper 2013/04, 3. 
33 Ting Xu and Jean Allain, ‘Introduction’ Ting Xu and Jean Allain (eds) Property and Human Rights in a Global Context 
(Hart 2016) 1, 2. 
34 Commission on Legal Empowerment of the Poor, Making the Law Work for Everyone (Commission on Legal 
Empowerment of the Poor and UNDP 2008) 64. 
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In many countries, land rights and security of tenure constitute the basis for access to food, 
livelihoods, housing and development for a large percentage of the population. Land is in many 
cases necessary also for the realization of other economic, social and cultural rights. Therefore, 
just and inclusive land rights have the potential to play a catalytic role in economic growth, 
development and poverty alleviation. Yet, land rights are still often viewed as part of the 
realization of other fundamental rights, such as the right to food or the right to water, rather 
than as a stand-alone human rights priority. Access, redistribution and guarantee of land rights 
are also crucial issues in post-conflict situations, especially in Africa and the Middle East. In 
those societies, property grievances need to be addressed in order to prevent new seeds of 
conflict being planted.  
In recent years, the UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR) has 
adopted a number of statements highlighting the need to respect land rights, explicitly referring 
to them in relation to other areas such as housing, forced evictions, food, water, health and 
cultural life. Thus far, however, there is still no clear and comprehensive statement on the 
fundamental importance of the right to land.35 
The urban poor, especially in Latin America, generally live in large shantytowns on the outskirts 
of major cities and are often migrants from the countryside in search of economic opportunities 
and personal security. However, that search is usually fruitless, because a pervasive feature of 
these squatter settlements is the vicious circle of illegality in which residents find themselves. 
Because the settlements habitually originated in land invasions, incomers do not have legally 
recognized property rights: their slums have no legal standing and thus basic amenities and 
services such as clean water, electricity, and sewage are not readily available. Other basic public 
services, such as health, education and police and fire prevention are likewise generally 
unavailable. Conflicts and disputes arising within these shantytowns rarely reach official channels 
and are thus decided by force, via illegal alternatives, or left unresolved to fester.36 
Another unfortunate fact in many developing countries is that women face legal and social 
barriers that prevent them from owning or inheriting assets, opening bank accounts, or accessing 
                                                          
35 Minority Rights Group International, Moving Towards a Right to Land (MRG 2015) 4, available at 
<http://minorityrights.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/10/MRG_Rep_LandRights_Oct15.pdf> accessed 16 April 
2017. 
36 Julio Faundez, ‘Should Justice Reform Projects Take Non-State Justice Systems Seriously? Perspectives from 
Latin America’ 2 The World Bank Legal Review: Law, Equity, and Development (World Bank 2006) 113, 121-22. 
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credit on their own. Discriminatory family, marital property and inheritance laws are pervasive 
particularly in Africa and the Middle East, rendering them legally inadequate and thus 
constraining a woman’s ability to engage in economic activity and realize her economic rights. 
Along with legal restrictions on women’s mobility, employment outside the home, and 
administration of personal assets, those laws present barriers to women’s economic 
opportunity.37 Strong property rights protection is required to ensure that women can engage as 
productive agents of economic growth and avoid destitution in case of widowhood or divorce. 
Women’s rights in relation to land, including equality with respect to property rights, inheritance, 
and titling of land and homesteads need to be modernized. Evidence shows that where land is 
securely held by women they are better able to support themselves and improve their families’ 
access to health care, education, and means of survival.38 
Still another priority to help advance the achievement of economic, political and social rights is 
to promote the creation of systems for collateralising moveable and intangible property – an 
example of how strong and effective creditor rights can help. Although many people in the 
developing world lack secure rights to use and transfer property, most own some tangible 
(moveable) or intangible property, such as intellectual property, brands or reputations. To the 
extent that this type of property is held securely and can be used to access credit and to create 
and grow businesses, the poor will have increased borrowing opportunities and investment 
capacity. Experience in a variety of developing countries shows that there are important legal 
reforms that if implemented will allow the poor to leverage their movable and intangible 
property.39 
This brings us to a critique of the view that human rights are of a different nature than property 
and creditor rights, one that is prevalent in the human rights literature.40 In this connection, the 
                                                          
37 Mary Hallward-Driemeier, Enterprising Women: Expanding Economic Opportunities in Africa (World Bank 2013) 159. 
38 Ana Palacio, ‘Legal Empowerment of the Poor: An Action Agenda for the World Bank’ (World Bank: March 
2006) 26 
<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTLAWJUSTINST/Resources/LegalEmpowermentofthePoor.pdf> 
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libertarian perspective is illuminating. It holds that property and human rights are inextricably 
linked, and not just because the former enable several of the latter, but also because, at their 
core, a number of human rights actually involve the assertion of property rights.  
Human rights recognize each man’s inalienable property right free of any coercive interference, 
and from this right to property follows the right to the services that one delivers. Each individual 
is the owner of himself, and thus the ruler of his own person; the human body is the first 
property of a human being.41 A man’s right to personal freedom, then, is his property right in 
himself.42 Consequently, when the UDHR states in article 4 that ‘no one shall be held in slavery 
or servitude …’ it is repudiating a condition in which humans’ right of self-ownership is 
disrespected, because a master is expropriating the services that a human renders.43 
In like manner, other UDHR rights can be considered extensions of the libertarian principle that 
each individual is the owner and ruler of his own person. Thus, article 1 (‘all human beings are 
born free and equal in dignity and rights …’) follows logically from a recognition of each 
person’s inalienable property right over his own being. So does article 2 (‘everyone is entitled to 
all the rights and freedoms set forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind …’), 
because discrimination depreciates the property value of humans being discriminated against. 
Article 3 (‘everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of person’) is but a reaffirmation of 
the concept that humans with property rights are free to utilize their own persons as they see fit. 
Article 5 (‘no one shall be subjected to torture or to cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or 
punishment’) likewise affirms the inalienable right to self-ownership. And so on and so forth 
with several other UDHR articles spelling out human rights rooted in the libertarian conception 
of property rights, which goes beyond the relationship between humans and objects. 
There is, moreover, another sense in which a number of human rights are essentially property 
rights, a sense obfuscated in the extant literature. Take, for example, the human right to press 
and Internet freedom, covered under article 19 UDHR (‘everyone has the right to freedom of 
opinion and expression … through any media …’). The extent to which this right is exercised 
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freely depends on how the state manages the distribution of newsprint, the licenses necessary to 
operate radio and television broadcast stations and any direct censorship of the airwaves and the 
Internet. If licenses to broadcast in a radio frequency spectrum are denied to political opponents, 
then the human right to a free media is compromised. If, on the other hand, radio broadcast 
permits are allocated by a non-governmental body through a transparent auction process, then 
the human right to a free media is much more likely to be respected. This illustrates how the 
human right to freedom of expression through any media outlet hinges on who owns the rights 
to newsprint, radio and TV broadcasting, and to uncensored Internet communications, and on 
how those rights are allocated. A human right like freedom of opinion and expression through 
any media, in this light, becomes essentially a property rights issue. 
Consider also the human right to freedom of assembly, protected under article 20 UDHR 
(‘everyone has the right to freedom of peaceful assembly …’). This right will be exercised when 
a privately owned convention hall or stadium is rented by anyone who can afford it regardless of 
their political or other leanings. Once the property is thus reserved for occupancy, the right of 
peaceful assembly can be realized because people will be able to come together; they will be able 
to speak, listen and mingle; and they will be free to distribute or exchange printed or audio-visual 
materials. However, if said facilities were owned by the local or national government, or by 
private owners who can be pressured by state officials and if political or social dissidents were 
denied their right to rent the hall or stadium in question then the human right to peaceful 
assembly will have been thwarted. The human right of free assembly thus hinges on the property 
right to hire an assembly hall from its owners.44 
In short, many human rights are connected to, and are rather inseparable from, broadly 
conceived property rights. At the very least, human rights advocates should admit that property 
and creditor rights are complementary to other human rights and thus cannot be neglected. The 
irony is that early conceptions of human rights developed throughout history in close association 
with notions of private property rights. The entitlement to civil and political rights championed 
in both the American and French Revolutions was tied to property issues and early proponents 
of what nowadays would be recognized as ‘human rights’ considered property rights just as 
important as the freedoms of religion and speech.45 
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There is good reason why human rights, as we now know them, are of relatively recent vintage: 
the world has functioned for millennia without a conception – never mind the implementation – 
of the many individual rights that came to be enshrined in various international conventions 
after the end of World War II. Throughout human history, many civilizations came to be 
regarded as successful even though they engaged in practices now considered unacceptably 
immoral, like slavery, discrimination, and cruel punishment. These societies developed despite 
failing to acknowledge rights to self-determination, religious freedom, direct representation, 
equal pay for equal work, free education, or social security. 
Property and creditor rights, on the other hand, evolved naturally to prevent or solve societal 
conflicts. Because of widespread recognition that they are necessary for commerce and 
investment to thrive, they have been upheld and enforced universally by nation states, especially 
so in an increasingly interconnected, efficient and modernizing world. And without trade and 
investment there cannot be vigorous economic progress – especially the kind of progress that 
can generate the resources necessary for society and particularly the state, to afford the 
aspirational entitlements that in the last seven decades have come to be identified as ‘human 
rights’. 
 
The gap between aspirational human rights and economic reality 
Most legal literature and United Nations documents on human rights gloss over the fact that the 
least developed countries are structurally and otherwise on a very different trajectory than that 
which Western Europe has travelled since the end of World War II. In the poorest and least 
rights-compliant parts of the world, economic, political, cultural and other realities are simply 
not amenable to a ‘cutting and pasting’ of the twentieth century European model of the welfare 
state for the purpose of realizing human rights. To paraphrase Kenneth Dam, the first instinct 
of lawyers, which is to transplant world-class legal and welfare institutions to developing 
countries in the hope that human rights will flourish, is sure to keep producing little more than a 
harvest of dead leaves.46 
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In human rights law, the state is traditionally considered the obligated party, because states are 
parties to the treaties central to the human rights regime. More significantly, states are also the 
obligated party because so many of the aspirational human rights – especially the economic and 
social ones – are expected to be delivered by their governments. As recalled by Louis Henkin, 
‘almost from [its post-War] beginning, the international law of human rights followed the 
movement within states from “the liberal state” to “the welfare state”’.47 Whereas the Universal 
Declaration drew on liberal national constitutions for its civil and political rights, for its 
economic and social rights ‘it drew on the welfare systems initiated in the nineteenth century by 
Western European states’.48 
Exhibit A when it comes to human rights mandates with steep price tags attached is the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). Consider its article 
2: ‘Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps … with a view to 
achieving progressively the full realization of the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all 
appropriate means, including particularly the adoption of legislative measures.’ In article 6, which 
deals with the right to work it stipulates that: ‘the steps to be taken by a state party to the present 
Covenant to achieve the full realization of this right shall include technical and vocational 
guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social 
and cultural development and full and productive employment…’ Article 9 declares that: ‘the 
states parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to social security, 
including social insurance.’ And in article 11 it states that the parties: ‘recognize the right of 
everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family, including adequate food, 
clothing and housing, and to the continuous improvement of living conditions [and they] will 
take appropriate steps to ensure the realization of this right.’ States are also obligated to take 
measures to ensure ‘the highest attainable standard of physical and mental health’ (article 12) and 
to provide educational services at the primary, secondary and tertiary levels free of charge in 
order to realize ‘the right of everyone to education’ (art. #13-14). 
These economic rights are very expensive to deliver and difficult to adjudicate because of the 
large financial resources they demand. They entail substantial government initiative, 
administration and spending in multiple and complex areas – including ones in which many 
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economists would prefer that states delegated to the private sector, either in principle or on 
grounds of unaccountability, corruption and inefficiency in the public sector. The establishment 
of a welfare state also fosters an entirely paternalistic vision of government, promoting 
dependence and a false sense of entitlement to a life people may have no intention of working or 
paying for. It clashes as a prescription with the evident need for low-income countries to 
encourage entrepreneurship, open up investment opportunities, facilitate hiring of labour in the 
formal economy, establish new businesses, and unleash market forces in order to jump-start 
their economic development. 
It is estimated that nearly three-fourths of the world’s population do not enjoy access to a 
comprehensive social security system, namely, one that ensures the realization of the privileges 
embodied in various human rights treaties by providing essential health care, unemployment 
compensation and supplemental income for persons earning very low pay, as well as retirement 
and disability benefits. Government spending on social protection and health ranges from the 
equivalent of 27 percent of GDP in Western Europe down to under six percent in Africa and 
Asia, with the world average (weighted by total population) at less than 10 percent of GDP. 
Only 12 percent of unemployed workers worldwide actually receive unemployment benefits, 
with effective coverage ranging from 64 percent of the unemployed in Western Europe to less 
than three percent in the Middle East and Africa.49 
There are good reasons why the Western European welfare state has not been successfully 
exported to the developing world in the past decades – particularly not to the most politically, 
socially, and economically fragile states where human rights abuses are a daily phenomenon. The 
most pragmatic reason is that governments in most developing countries consider it impossible 
to raise the kind of permanent tax revenues that would be necessary to underwrite welfare 
benefits akin to those that Western Europe offers and the ICESCR prescribes. While 
governments in the Eurozone, on average (2014-16), take in revenues equivalent to 46 percent 
of GDP, their counterparts in low-income developing economies – from Bangladesh to 
Zimbabwe – reap on average a mere 16 percent of GDP, namely, about one-third as much.50 
Doubling, never mind tripling, their tax take in order to afford a European welfare state would 
be a completely unattainable objective. 
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In fact, most poor-country governments cannot conceivably offer unemployment or retirement 
benefits, at least not to the vast majority of their people. Between half and three-quarters of their 
labour force operates in the underground economy – largely in agriculture, construction, small-
scale manufacturing, and services – and thus workers neither pay the contributions necessary to 
cover the cost of such benefits nor can they properly document instances of employment for 
pay, on the one hand, and unemployment without pay, on the other. Indeed, informality is one 
of the important characteristics of labour markets around the world, with millions of (mostly 
small) enterprises and over a billion workers operating in the shadows. In more than half of 
reporting developing countries – from destitute Madagascar to relatively wealthy Uruguay – the 
share of informal employment in non-agricultural areas exceeds 50 percent, and in about one-
third of countries it accounts for at least 67 percent of total non-farm jobs.51 
Beyond the tight fiscal space that limited tax revenues generate, it is hard to imagine that many 
governments in developing countries, not least in Africa and the Middle East, could acquire the 
administrative capacity to deliver welfare-like benefits effectively, given the power struggles and 
rent-seeking activities that have consumed them. As it is, domestic factors and political 
arrangements have solidified non-egalitarian and corrupt institutions in many developing 
countries, such that the more privileged classes are traditionally the largest beneficiaries of any 
public social spending. Moreover, the welfare state as known in Europe is an alien concept in 
most low-income countries, where the role of governments in the delivery of services is typically 
far less important than that of informal family and tribal networks, who provide the bulk of 
income support and social services. 
Even in middle-income developing countries, many of which have attempted to introduce 
elements of the European welfare state, results have not always been satisfactory or productive. 
One reason is that economic development is a process whereby workers gradually shift from 
low- to high-productivity activities, and generally from agriculture into manufacturing and 
services, and where they benefit from the adoption of more capital- and technology-intensive 
production processes. The result is an increase in labour productivity, which is the basis for 
rising wages and salaries, and thus the increase of national incomes. 
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In Mexico, for instance, social policy – the set of programs through which governments offer 
health services, housing loans, day care services, and various types of pensions to workers of any 
income level, type of employment, or labour status – has acted as a drag on that country’s 
structural transformation process. The reason is that those well-intentioned interventions have 
slowed down the reduction of low-productivity agricultural employment and the increase in 
high-productivity jobs elsewhere in the economy. They have subsidized inefficient self-
employment and other forms of non-salaried employment, as well as illegal salaried employment. 
Therefore, they have interfered with the process by which workers seek jobs that are more 
productive and firms invest, grow, adopt new technologies, train workers, and take measures to 
increase their efficiency.52 
In sum, the expectations of human rights advocates have not kept pace with the very limited 
capacity to institute a European welfare state, especially in the low-income countries most prone 
to human rights deficiencies. The common practice for scholars working on human rights and 
social policy in developing countries has been to advocate for larger shares of public spending 
on welfare. Little or no attention has been paid to the necessary revenues and administrative 
capacity, or to counterproductive impacts on economic incentives and this has led scholars 
down a barren path covered with Professor Dam’s proverbial dead leaves.  
The time has come for realistic, context-specific proposals that take account of cultural realities, 
political-economy issues, budgetary constraints, development imperatives, and imperfect 
institutions. The private sector, and not the public sector, will likely have to play a major role in 
the generation of jobs and the provision of health, insurance, educational and other services. 
Good intentions are much more likely to be successful when European or other alien legal and 
economic models are adapted to local environments.53 Until then, it should not surprise or 
disappoint that states disagree about which human rights should have priority, what scarce 
resources are allocated to alleviating human rights violations, and how cultural variations and 
institutional differences are respected.54 
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Interconnections between sovereign debt, human rights, and 
property and creditor rights 
Legal writings on the interconnections between sovereign debt and human rights betray their 
authors’ lack of familiarity with economics and finance and also with the lessons of practical 
experience in impoverished and rights-deprived countries around the world. In particular, few 
legal scholars and human-rights advocates have engaged in a critical analysis of what has 
transpired, in the past decade-and-a-half, in the many low-income countries that became 
beneficiaries of debt forgiveness from official bilateral and multilateral agencies. The mostly 
shallow and incomplete approach to the interconnections between sovereign debt and human 
rights has led many contemporary writers astray in their thinking, expectations and policy 
recommendations. 
A common point of departure for most human rights attorneys, debt-forgiveness campaigners, 
and UN Human Rights Council representatives is the claim that in many of the world’s poorest 
countries the fulfilment of debt-service obligations has frequently come at the expense of social 
expenditures that contribute to the realization of human rights.55 According to Dustin Sharp:  
In cases where a highly indebted state spends a significant portion of its budget on 
debt servicing, it stands to reason that less money will generally be available to 
progressively realise rights to things like health and education, and in many 
instances it will be hard for the state to satisfy core minimum obligations.56 
Indeed, according to Sabine Michalowski, ‘resources that are dedicated to debt repayment will 
not be available in order to improve the social rights situation in the country, and vice versa’.57 
The trade-off between debt service and social spending is an oft-repeated assertion that has its 
origin in misleading anecdotal claims long made in Jubilee 2000 campaign materials – the 
coalition of religious organisations that has been advocating for debt forgiveness (cancellation) 
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of the debts of the poorest countries since the early 1990s.58 The claims have a faulty logic. To 
illustrate: during the 1980s, the twenty-nine countries (from Afghanistan to Zimbabwe) now 
considered the world’s poorest made US$17¼ billion in debt-service payments on their long-
term foreign debt, the equivalent of 2⅔ percent of their average annual GDP.59 Yet, this does 
not mean that during the 1980s these countries had less money to ‘progressively realise rights to 
things like health and education’. 
The reason is that, during the 1980s, the twenty-nine countries also obtained US$42½ billion of 
new long-term foreign loans, the equivalent of 6¾ percent of their average annual GDP – such 
that they actually enjoyed a net of US$25¼ billion in additional long-term funds with which to 
‘progressively realise rights to things like health and education’.60 To put it in perspective, the 
countries had on average an extra four percentage points of GDP – an economically meaningful 
amount – they could spend, each year, for whatever purposes the loans were intended. The 
elemental mistake made by the Jubilee campaigners, and by all those who have since parroted 
their line, is akin to alleging that home mortgage payments force homebuyers to cut back on 
their food or health or educational spending. 
It should not surprise, therefore, that the claim of a trade-off between foreign debt service and 
domestic social spending finds no support in the economic literature. The more credible 
hypothesis concerns a potential trade-off between a rapidly growing stock of foreign debt and 
domestic social spending, given the threat of higher taxes and debt service a borrowing binge 
may portend. The evidence on this issue is mixed, however. One author who assessed how rising 
external debt burdens influenced the composition of government spending in forty-seven 
developing countries during 1972-2001, found that in Africa and the Middle East it had 
impacted negatively government investment outlays and current spending other than on salaries, 
which in fact tended to increase.61 Since a large part of social expenditure involves salaries paid 
to government employees in education and health, this finding suggests that human-rights-
related budgetary spending actually was more than shielded from the adverse effects of rising 
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debt burdens – a conclusion consistent with prior research results on the resilience of this type 
of spending to austerity campaigns. 
On the other hand, researchers looking at whether government spending on health and 
education relative to GDP were affected by changes in the ratio of total (external and domestic) 
public debt to GDP, found the opposite trend using a panel of up to fifty-seven developing 
countries for the period 1985-2003.62 Following an increase in the stock of total debt relative to 
GDP, governments typically reacted prudently, by cutting spending growth and raising revenues 
by an amount beyond the increase in their interest bills, thus tightening somewhat the overall 
fiscal stance, and in the process, trimming new allocations to social spending. 
The preoccupation with the potential fallout from rising debt and debt-service burdens that has 
permeated the human rights literature is also gravely misplaced. Ever since the early 2000s, social 
spending of the kind that supposedly contributes to the realization of human rights – at least as 
per the welfare-state model embraced by most advocates – has actually increased rapidly in the 
world’s poorest and least human-rights compliant nations. During this period, most low-income 
countries benefited from the best external environment in decades: massive debt forgiveness 
from their official creditors under the HIPC Initiative, as enhanced in the mid-2000s; a historic 
boom in commodity prices and thus exports and tax revenues, especially during 2002-2011; and 
easier-than-ever access to new financing, especially from the private international capital markets 
at exceedingly favourable interest rates.63 
The key trends were the following. The same group of twenty-nine poorest countries, which had 
seen their combined total external indebtedness skyrocket from the equivalent of less than 50 
percent of their GDP prior to 1982 to over 125 percent by 1994, registered a major cut in that 
ratio to under 30 percent of GDP during 2010-14.64 In relation to total export earnings, the 
group’s total external debt, which had jumped to over 600 percent by the mid-1990s from under 
300 percent in the early 1980s, came down precipitously to under 110 percent by 2011-12. The 
poorest countries’ annual debt-service payments on long-term foreign debt, which had risen to 
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the equivalent to two percent of GDP in the early 1980s, and had jumped to over three percent 
by the mid-1990s, shrunk to less than one percent of GDP in 2008-10. 
Before the HIPC Initiative, the thirty-six countries (from Afghanistan to Zambia) that became 
eligible for debt forgiveness, including twenty-six of the twenty-nine world’s poorest countries, 
were spending on average slightly more on debt service than on health and education combined. 
Since the mid-1990s, and as per the HIPC’s requirement that governments allocate debt-service 
savings to social spending, they were ramped up markedly: their spending on health, education 
and other social services went up from less than six percent of GDP prior to 2000 to almost 
nine percent in recent years.65 On average, such spending (nine percent of GDP) was about five 
times the current amount of debt-service payments (less than two percent). 
Consequently, the question that should have been raised for research and intelligent discussion is 
whether the increase in social expenditures that transpired has indeed contributed to the 
enhanced realization of human rights in the most deprived parts of the world – yet, we are not 
aware of any quantitative studies or thoughtful reflection along these lines in the legal literature. 
To be sure, recent, comprehensive reports on the state of human rights around the globe, 
produced by authorities like Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch, highlight few 
instances of advancements in human rights, and on the contrary they warn of retrogression in 
the many conflict-ridden and destitute countries in Africa and the Middle East.66 But at least 
casual empiricism has prompted one human rights academic, Daniel Sharp, to acknowledge that 
while ‘basic maths – comparing money spent on debt servicing with funds budgeted for public 
health programmes, for example – suggests that debt relief has great potential to help 
governments progressively realise economic and social rights, the reality is far more 
complicated’.67 
Economists have been busy shedding light in their area of competence, which is the link 
between government expenditures and advances in health, education and other social objectives. 
Interestingly, their research into the recent surge in social spending in low-income countries 
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constitutes a powerful indictment of the approach that throwing more money – including debt-
service savings – at health, educational and other problems is the appropriate way to progress.  
As it turns out, the endemic inefficiency and corruption prevalent in low-income countries has 
rendered higher government spending largely ineffectual in the HIPC universe. For example, it 
has been estimated that governments in Africa could have boosted life expectancy by five years 
if they had followed best healthcare practices; by comparison, a ten percent increase in public 
health spending per capita has tended to yield an increase in life expectancy of a mere two 
months.68 According to another study, improving the quality of governance in Sub-Saharan 
Africa is imperative in order to improve health outcomes: the same increase in public spending 
on health has been twice as effective in reducing under-five years’ mortality, as well as in 
increasing life expectancy at birth, in countries with good-quality relative to poor-quality 
governance.69 Yet, a third research project concluded that a greater share of public health 
provision has not improved quality of life and life length itself. It found that reduction of 
inequalities in access to, and the provision of, health and educational services is a far more 
significant determinant of longer and healthier lives.70 
Studies of higher public spending on education have reached similar conclusions: education 
spending has been highly inefficient in many emerging and developing economies, and especially 
so in Africa. By eliminating inefficiencies, according to one estimate, lower-income economies 
could have raised their average net enrolment rate by 36 percentage points without any increase 
in existing spending levels.71 Another study concluded that the effect of debt relief on 
educational expenditures in the HIPC countries, if any, could not be captured in statistical 
studies, suggesting that government spending is not the primary vehicle through which 
improvements in educational variables materialize.72 
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It is no wonder, therefore, that the low-income countries that have benefited from massive debt 
forgiveness have not shown a correspondingly meaningful improvement in measurable quality-
of-life indicators – despite the hike in social spending. At last count (2016), the majority of the 
thirty-six HIPC countries previously mentioned do not meet, and are not on track to meet, any 
of the eight Millennium Development Goal (MDG) outcomes, as well as the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), which are the successors to the MDGs. The poorest achievements 
by the HIPC countries involve precisely the much-favoured education and health-related sectors. 
Specifically, only a handful (one to three) of the thirty-six HIPCs is within reach of the MDG 
targets in the areas of: (1) an increase in primary school completion rates; (2) a decrease in 
maternal mortality rates, and; (3) an escalation in access to improved sanitation facilities. Only 
seven of the thirty-six, or 19 percent, of the HIPCs are within striking distance of the MDG 
target in the area of decreased infant mortality rates.73 
The proverbial writing was already on the wall more than a decade ago, when two reputable 
development economists asked the question: ‘What Has 100 Billion Dollars’ Worth of Debt 
Relief Done for Low-Income Countries?’ Their answer was that early analysis of the data as of 
the mid-2000s was not providing much support for the idea that debt relief was effective in 
achieving its stated objectives, e.g., improving policy performance and enhancing economic 
growth, investment, total government spending and tax collection.74 Other contemporaneous 
studies also found that debt relief provided under the HIPC Initiative was having little impact on 
either investment or growth, probably because of the absence of the enabling institutions and 
business environment that provide the foundation for market economies.75 
Since that time additional economic studies have concluded that there is no clear evidence that 
debt forgiveness enabled higher investment or faster economic growth, except in the few 
countries with sound economic and political institutions,76 or else under favourable economic 
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circumstances,77 and mainly in the absence of armed conflict.78 Consequently, it is difficult to 
disentangle pure debt-relief effects from other benign and concurrent factors. The evidence 
suggests that many destitute countries cannot escape poverty traps even when they obtain debt 
forgiveness, because debt burdens were never the binding constraint: their weak institutions, 
incompetent administrations, distorted markets, weak property and creditor rights, and political 
instability constitute the undesirable foundations that usually keep them mired in poverty. 
These hard facts and research findings, however, have largely been ignored by the human rights 
community, and thus they have not enlightened the understanding of the relationship between 
sovereign debt and human rights among human rights lawyers and activists. In some cases, 
notably the legal experts that have served the United Nations as independent experts on foreign 
debt issues, a denial of reality has led them to double down on fiction. According to Cephas 
Lumina, who held the post of UN Independent Expert during 2008-2015: 
Governments should not be placed in a situation where they are unable to ensure 
the realization of basic human rights because of excessive debt repayments. It may 
be contended that states’ responsibility to ensure the enjoyment of basic human 
rights may take priority over their debt-service obligations, particularly when such 
payments further limit the ability of states to fulfil their human rights obligations.79 
And as per Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky, who serves as UN Independent Expert since 2014:  
Countries are concerned that, if they fail to make debt payments, they will be unable 
to access capital at a reasonable cost in the future. This pragmatic reaction to 
markets, however, should not be confused with an absolute legal obligation to 
repay. Under certain circumstances, particularly when economic, social and cultural 
rights [are] at risk, the operation of contract[s] may not be sufficiently compelling to 
ask the populations of sovereign states to fully repay their debts in a timely manner. 
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… The scope of the pacta sunt servanda principle is thus limited by sovereignty and 
human rights.80 
These provocative opinions lack legal justification and are counterproductive, especially given 
the increasingly heavier reliance, even by low-income countries, on funding from private rather 
than official (bilateral and multilateral) sources of debt finance. During the six-year period 2010-
2015, private-sector sources of finance (commercial banks, bond investors, suppliers and other) 
provided 95 percent of the net debt flows (disbursements minus principal repayments) into the 
entire universe (123 countries) of low- and middle-income countries, while official sources 
accounted for the remaining five percent. But even for the forty-four countries in Sub-Saharan 
Africa (from Angola to Zimbabwe), during the same six years, private sources of finance 
accounted for almost half (48 percent) of their net debt-related capital inflows. In contrast, until 
the early 2000s, private sources of finance delivered only a negligible amount of net debt finance 
to Sub-Saharan Africa.81 
Whenever a developing-country government enters into a cross-border loan agreement with 
private-sector lenders, or signs an international bond indenture with foreign investors, the 
government almost always has to provide a waiver of its sovereign immunity to jurisdiction and 
from execution. Such a waiver ensures that if the debtor state breaches its contract with the 
lenders or investors, it will not seek immunity from suit, execution, or enforcement by virtue of 
its status as a sovereign. Therefore, sovereign debtors borrowing outside of their own territory 
are usually answerable in foreign courts for their performance of their commercial contracts 
under the doctrine known as the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity. 
By the same token, whenever commercial disputes arise involving sovereigns and private-sector 
creditors, the overwhelming majority of the time they are negotiated rather than litigated.82 The 
presentation of arguments involving human rights priorities, odious debts, economic necessity, 
political constraints, and the like may be voiced in a private negotiating room – but they have no 
standing in a courtroom, especially in London, New York or other financial centres where 
contract law rules supreme. The Argentina litigation and arbitration saga during 2002-2016 was 
                                                          
80 United Nations, ‘Report of the Independent Expert on the effects of foreign debt and other related international 
financial obligations of States on the full enjoyment of all human rights, particularly economic, social and cultural 
rights’ (A/70/275 4 August 2015) 14. 
81 World Bank (n 59). 
82 Lee C Buchheit and G Mitu Gulati, ‘Responsible Sovereign Lending and Borrowing’ (2010) 73 Law & Contemp 
Probs 63, 69. 
29 
 
the notable exception that proved the rule that sovereigns are well advised to negotiate, rather 
than litigate, their commercial disputes.83 
Given that creditors can usually rely on enforceable legal rights, especially in their own 
jurisdictions, governments that decide to service debt in the knowledge that they are 
compromising their social rights obligations may find themselves in violation of their 
international obligations under treaties such as the ICESCR. However, such a violation, 
according to Michalowski: 
[D]oes not have any legal consequences, whereas defaulting on debt servicing could 
result in lawsuits the debtor countries are likely to lose. In reality, then, where states 
face conflicting obligations, international law does not provide adequate 
mechanisms to encourage compliance with social rights obligations, and debtor 
states have instead little choice but to prioritise their contractual obligations.84 
It is ironic that any human-rights lawyer should be advocating that states ought to disrespect the 
rights of their creditors whenever their budgetary resources prove insufficient to underwrite the 
alleged delivery of economic and social rights. As previously mentioned, and because of 
widespread waste and inefficiency, the thirty-six countries that already obtained massive debt 
forgiveness from their official creditors have little to show for the significant increase in 
government spending for health and education services that said forgiveness afforded them.  
Second, defaulting on foreign debt obligations is a serious matter because of the reputational, 
economic and financial damage that usually follows. The impression conveyed, that a 
government default constitutes a ‘free lunch’ option that releases fiscal resources for domestic 
spending purposes, is highly misleading because it disregards the lessons of historical experience 
– especially in cases of coercive or punishing debt restructurings, when the fallout has been 
severe.85 
Third, government defaults undermine what in developing countries usually are already weak 
and fragile legal, institutional and regulatory safeguards for lenders and investors, whether 
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domestic or foreign.86 Attracting loans and investments to developing countries – especially the 
poorest – requires that repayment and transfer risks be reasonable and manageable. International 
trade is a system of commercial relationships predicated on contractual agreements involving a 
wide range of creditors and constituencies. The extension of cross-border credit is grounded on 
its timely repayment and its costs are influenced by the risks and potential for default, as well as 
the associated expenses and delays of recovery. 
The suggestion that property and creditor rights may be sacrificed at the altar of welfare 
spending is thus sheer folly, given the abundant evidence in the financial, economic and legal 
literature that respect for property and creditor rights is a fundamental prerequisite for the 
forward evolution and prosperity of nations.87 Good investor protection, broadly defined as the 
contents and enforcement of regulations that protect investors in property and securities, 
combined with independent and reliable judicial and regulatory institutions, foster the 
development of financial markets, promote capital accumulation, encourage entrepreneurship 
and innovation, enable fruitful domestic and international trade, and thus boost economic 
growth and development. 
As David Kinley has stated: 
[T]he golden eggs of economic prosperity are essential ingredients in any plans or 
policies that seek better to protect and promote human rights, so to kill their 
progenitor or even to hinder significantly her fecundity would indeed be a serious 
problem. Uncompromising demands that the goose be neutered – that is, that the 
profit motive ought to be dispensed with, or the whole idea of trade liberalisation 
be abandoned, or aid be entirely decoupled from liberalist economic conditionality 
– are simplistic, counter-productive and today, thankfully, infrequently voiced 
arguments for better human rights observance.88 
Finally, government defaults are very blunt weapons. In an increasingly integrated world where 
foreign lenders and investors are active also in domestic financial markets, and where local 
banks, corporations and individual investors are also involved in the international capital 
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markets, it is difficult for governments to target a default in a way such as to prevent damage to 
human rights beyond those of the creditors. The case of Argentina is once again very instructive. 
For many years after the fall of a brutal military dictatorship in 1983, the families of those 
abducted, tortured and killed (‘disappeared’ during a ‘Dirty War’) fought to get successor 
governments to admit responsibility and pay compensation, including for survivors. Amends 
were finally made starting a dozen years later, in the mid-1990s, when a first wave of political 
prisoners and families of the dead were given government bonds in compensation for their 
suffering.89 
A few years later, in late 2001, a successor administration infamously defaulted on its obligations 
to bondholders, and caught in the net were the few thousand bonds given out in compensation 
for human rights abuses. Their owners petitioned to be exempted from losses of as much as 70 
percent that the government sought to impose, but were told they could not be excluded 
because otherwise the legal principle that all creditors must be treated equally would be 
infringed, thereby exposing the government to a flood of lawsuits from the other jilted 
creditors.90 They went on to pursue justice in the courts of Argentina, but despite support from a 
government ombudsman, they had no success.91 Directly impacted by the 2001 default were also 
hundreds of thousands of retirees in Argentina and Italy, whose rights to social security were 
thus seriously affected.92 
 
Conclusion 
Post-War conceptions of human rights have evolved independently of long-established theory 
and practice of property and creditor rights, to the detriment of the development and 
implementation of human rights law.  
The divergence in legal evolution of these two specialized areas owes much to the isolation in 
which they operate, and is part of a broader phenomenon of fragmentation in international law 
akin to the gulf that separates the concept of property as protected in human rights law versus in 
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international investment law.93 Notwithstanding evident similarities and important 
interconnections, there is hardly any interaction and cross-citation between human rights 
scholars, on the one hand, and property and creditor-rights scholars, on the other. Therefore, 
notions and ideas from one field of international law are virtually unknown in another, and legal 
problems and solutions common in one field are ignored by the other. Just as lamentable, 
whereas property and creditor-rights scholars are usually well versed in, or at least acquainted 
with, economic and financial concepts and their problem-solving applications, it is evident that 
human rights scholars are woefully unprepared in this regard. 
The objective of this chapter was to build a first bridge between these two fields of law. It began 
by recalling the strikingly different origin and implementation of ‘human’ versus property and 
creditor rights, because the differences have significant implications. Human rights laws are 
more honoured in the breach than in the observance in most parts of the world, principally 
because states accepted international standards governing the treatment of their own nationals in 
their own territory while reserving to themselves the sovereign right to enforce those rights as 
they saw fit. In sharp contrast, when it comes to property and creditor rights, there are few gaps 
between principled intentions, legal mandates, and actual enforcement. 
The importance of the recognition of property and creditor rights for the attainment of other 
human rights, especially those of an economic nature, was then highlighted. Many human rights 
are connected to, and are rather inseparable from, broadly conceived property rights. At the very 
least, human rights advocates should admit that property and creditor rights are complementary 
to other human rights and cannot be neglected – especially when considering trampling over 
them. 
There followed a discussion of the still wide gap between aspirational human rights and 
economic reality. The time has come for human rights scholars to ratchet down their 
expectations to match the very limited capacity of the low-income and formerly communist 
countries most prone to human rights deficiencies to import the Western European welfare state 
model. 
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The final section focused on the poorly understood interconnections between sovereign debt 
and human rights. Neglect of property and creditor-rights considerations has led many 
contemporary human rights advocates down an infertile, if not inappropriate, intellectual and 
policy path. Speculation that contracts governing cross-border debts and investments may not 
be sufficiently compelling, at least relative to human rights commitments, is unwarranted and 
counterproductive. 
